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Abstract  
This article offers new theoretical and empirical insights to explain the resilience of U.S. 
Treasury securities as the world’s premier safe or “risk free” asset. The standard explanation 
of resilience emphasizes the relative safety of U.S. Treasuries due to a shortage of safe assets 
in the global political economy. The analysis here goes beyond the standard explanation to 
highlight the importance of domestic politics in reinforcing the safe status of U.S. Treasury 
securities. In particular, the research shows how a formidable “bond” of interests unites 
domestic and foreign owners of the public debt and works to sustain U.S. power in global 
finance. Foreigners who now own roughly half of the U.S. public debt have something to 
gain from their domestic counterparts. The top one percent of U.S. households that 
dominate domestic ownership of U.S. Treasuries has considerable political clout, thus 
alleviating foreign concerns about the creditworthiness of the U.S. federal government. 
Domestic owners, in turn, benefit from the seemingly insatiable foreign appetite for U.S. 
Treasury securities. In supplying the U.S. federal government and U.S. households with 
cheap credit, foreign investors in U.S. Treasuries help to deflect challenges to the top one 
percent within the wealth and income hierarchy.  
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Introduction: Safety is Everyone’s Business 
 
Why have U.S. Treasury securities maintained their status as the world’s premier safe asset 
since the onset of the global financial crisis?1 For some pundits, the fact that investors 
continue to treat U.S. Treasury securities as the safest asset in the world seems counter-
intuitive, if not completely contradictory. Persistent budget deficits, successive rounds of 
unconventional monetary policy (so-called “quantitative easing”), and political wrangling 
over the debt ceiling, have rattled foreign confidence in U.S. Treasuries. And yet, despite 
growing signs of discontent, vast sums of money from all over the world continue to flood 
into the U.S. Treasuries market, allowing the federal government to borrow at relatively low 
rates.2 Foreign official and foreign private investors currently own around half of the U.S. 
public debt and this foreign appetite for U.S. Treasuries shows little sign of abating. 
 
Understanding the crisis-era resiliency of the U.S. Treasuries market should be of 
considerable interest to researchers in the fields of international political economy and 
international relations more generally. Offering the largest and most liquid financial market 
in the world, the U.S. public debt has long been recognized as a source of U.S. financial 
power in the global political economy.3 Determining why foreign investors continue to put 
their faith in the creditworthiness of the federal government helps to shed light on how U.S. 
financial power has been sustained in the aftermath of the crisis, and on how that financial 
power might evolve in the future.  
 
In this article, I offer new theoretical and empirical insights to explain the resiliency of the 
U.S. Treasuries market. The most commonly espoused explanation suggests that U.S. 
Treasury securities maintain their status as the premier safe asset simply because of a 
shortage of safe assets in the rest of the world. But I argue that the safe status of U.S. 
Treasuries is also augmented and reinforced in crucial ways by the configuration of the U.S. 
political economy. In particular, domestic owners of roughly the other half of the U.S. public 
debt constitute a powerful bloc of interests working to ensure that the federal government 
maintains its fiscal credibility.   
 
My analysis is framed primarily as a critical engagement with the work of Eswar Prasad 
(2014), whose book, The Dollar Trap: How The U.S Dollar Tightened its Grip on Global Finance, 
offers an insightful account of U.S. financial power since the crisis. Prasad claims that the 
dominant domestic owners of the U.S. public debt are retirees and near-retirees, a group that 
uses its voting power in elections to further its interests as creditors to the federal 
government. Though seniors do indeed own a substantial share of the public debt and make 
up a significant part of the electorate, I argue that the image of older Americans as a 
coherent political group is highly misleading. The empirical record in the field of gerontology 
consistently shows that seniors are divided on political issues, and, as a group, have limited 
influence over the political process.   
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As an alternative, I argue that the power of domestic owners of the public debt derives not 
from their age or their status as retirees per se, but instead from their class position at the very 
apex of the wealth and income hierarchy. On a per capita basis, ownership of the public debt 
is much more heavily concentrated in favour of the top one percent of U.S. households than 
it is for older Americans. Concentrated ownership of the public debt, I claim, confers 
structural power on the top percentile. Stretching well beyond the realm of electoral politics, 
the latent threat of exit from the government bond market serves to discipline government 
and society into committing themselves to the principles of “sound finance”. This structural 
power is most evident at ideological level. My research shows that the top percentile’s share 
of the public debt has increased over the past few decades alongside an ideological shift in 
federal government policy, one that prioritizes the interests of government bondholders over 
the general citizenry.  
 
The alternative focus on class does not modify Prasad’s general conclusion. Whether the 
power of domestic owners of the public debt is conceptualized in terms of class or age, we 
still end up concluding that their interests are closely aligned with their foreign counterparts. 
But what this class-based approach does give us is a deeper and much more complex 
understanding of the interests that unite foreign and domestic owners of the public debt. 
What I argue, through the intended use of wordplay, is that the “bond” between domestic 
and foreign owners is actually much stronger than Prasad’s account would have us believe. It 
is not only foreign owners of the public debt that benefit from the existence of powerful 
domestic counterparts. Domestic owners, too, have much to gain from foreign ownership of 
the public debt.  
 
How exactly does this work? Seemingly insatiable foreign appetite for U.S. Treasury 
securities means access to cheaper credit in the U.S. Cheaper credit relieves political 
pressures for progressive taxation and allows low and middle income Americans to keep up 
consumption in the wake of stagnant wages. On both counts, foreign investors in the public 
debt help to deflect challenges to their domestic counterparts within the wealth and income 
hierarchy. At least in the short-term, the bond of interests between owners of the public 
debt reinforces the dominant position of the U.S. within global finance. In this sense, the 
research here supports arguments that what we have witnessed thus far is a “status quo 
crisis”, one that has failed to bring about any fundamental transformation to the global 
financial order (Helleiner 2014).  
 
My analysis in the remainder of this article unfolds in four sections. In the first section, I 
review the relevant IPE literature on public debt as a source of financial power. Here I pay 
particular attention to outlining and scrutinizing Prasad’s arguments concerning the power of 
retirees and near-retirees as domestic owners of the public debt. I then develop an alternative 
class-based account of the power of domestic owners of the public debt in the second 
section, focusing on the top percentile. In the third section, I illustrate how the alternative 
class approach allows us to appreciate the deeper “bond” between foreign and domestic 
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owners of the public debt. Finally, in the fourth section, I summarize the research findings 
and discuss how they relate to the notion of a “status quo crisis”.   
 
Foundations of Financial Power 
 
Public debt has long been regarded as an important source of financial power (Di Muzio, 
2007; Rasler and Thompson, 1983; Schultz and Weingast, 2003). The ability to borrow large 
sums at low cost from voluntary lenders has allowed states to augment their military 
prowess, invest in public infrastructure, provide welfare for citizens and engage in counter-
cyclical spending to combat financial instability. The main advantage of public debt is that it 
allows for “tax smoothing”: borrowing now and gradually repaying in installments later frees 
governments from the cumbersome task of quickly raising large sums through taxation. 
Government borrowing therefore lessens the risk of a tax revolt and frees up funds for 
private investment, a crucial determinant of growth. Public indebtedness can also promote 
social cohesion by making the domestic owners of government bonds feel, quite literally, 
invested in the fate of their government.  
 
While borrowing domestically can bolster financial power, the accumulation of large foreign 
debts has generally been associated with weakness (Bradshaw and Huang, 1991). According 
to the conventional wisdom, capital flows downhill from rich countries to poor ones. Without 
established financial markets and institutions, governments from underdeveloped countries 
have sought credit from the developed world. These arrangements have often ended badly 
for the debtor nation. Financial history is filled with examples of poor countries unable to 
service their debts, and, as a result, being forced to relinquish sovereignty as a condition of 
restructuring.  
 
Yet over the past few decades the assumptions that underpin the conventional wisdom have 
been challenged by a remarkable development. The world’s most powerful state, the United 
States, has itself become heavily indebted to foreigners. To complicate matters, the US has 
become increasingly indebted in recent years not only to other rich countries but also to 
China, an emerging market ruled by an authoritarian communist regime. Going against the 
conventional wisdom, a significant amount of capital now flows uphill from a poor country 
to the world’s wealthiest one (Chinn and Frieden, 2011: 16; Prasad, 2014: 31-46). And 
researchers have been unable to come to any consensus on what this means for U.S. power 
in the global political economy.  
 
The Rise of U.S. Foreign Indebtedness 
 
Before outlining the debate, Figure 1 provides some background on what is at stake. As the 
thick line in the figure shows, the share of the U.S. public debt owned by the rest of the 
world has risen sharply over the past four decades. From 16 percent in the 1970s and 1980s 
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this share climbed to 23 percent in the 1990s, then to 47 percent in 2007. Since the onset of 
the crisis, foreign ownership of U.S. Treasuries has remained steady at around 50 percent.  
 
 
 
To explain what is driving this massive increase in foreign ownership of the U.S. public debt, 
we turn to the thin series in Figure 1. This series tracks the U.S. current account balance, 
which, in simple terms, records the balance of a country’s spending over its income (as a 
percentage of GDP). There are two broad components of the current account: the 
government sector balance (federal, state and local) and the private domestic balance 
(households and businesses). Since the early 1980s, the U.S. domestic sector (i.e. government 
and the domestic private sectors combined) has run deficits. The government sector has 
been the contributor to the domestic deficit, though outside of recessions and crises, the 
domestic private sector has also seen its balance deteriorate over roughly the same period. 
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Figure 1 US Current Account Balance and Foreign Share of Public Debt 
 
Note: "Rest of the World" includers both foreign official and foreign private 
investors.  
 
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, for thick series, table L.209; for 
thin series, Tables F.2 and F.8.  
percent percent 
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Persistent U.S. current account deficits register as a surplus for the rest of the world. And 
foreigners use this surplus to purchase domestic assets, including Treasury securities.4 
 
Global demand for U.S. Treasuries has been fuelled by a number of developments (Prasad, 
2014: 12-13). Since the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the central banks of emerging 
markets accumulated U.S. Treasuries as part of their growing stockpiles of foreign exchange 
reserves. As a form of “self insurance”, these vast reserves shield emerging markets from the 
volatility associated with global capital flows. Rising foreign ownership of the public debt is 
also a reflection of export-led development strategies in various countries, including China, 
which recycle dollars earned from trade surpluses back into the U.S. Treasuries market. In 
addition to earning interest, dollar recycling prevents emerging market currencies from 
appreciating against the dollar, thus helping exporters to maintain their global 
competitiveness. In times of crisis, official and foreign private demand only increases, as 
investors seek out Treasuries as a “safe haven” from global tumult.5 
 
The Debate: Weakness or Strength? 
 
The spectacular rise in foreign ownership of U.S. Treasuries has spawned plenty of debate 
and controversy within IPE and cognate fields. In the lead up to the crisis, this dispute was 
polarized into two main camps, one arguing that foreign ownership was a clear sign of U.S. 
weakness, the other a sign of U.S. strength.  
 
For some, the accumulation of Treasury securities by the rest of the world pre-2007 was an 
outcome of persistent trade deficits, which reflect an inability of the U.S. to compete in 
globalized markets, and unsustainable budget deficits, which reflect grave dysfunction in the 
U.S. political system (Eichengreen, 2004; Setser and Roubini, 2005). The pre-crisis capital 
inflows did not fuel productive investment, but instead funded wasteful military adventures, 
as well as a dangerous housing bubble (Kirshner, 2006: 155). Once the crisis hit, they argued, 
a massive foreign sell-off of Treasuries would ensue, driving down the value of the U.S. 
dollar, driving up U.S. interest rates and finally bringing an end to America’s “exorbitant 
privilege” in global finance. The problems would be aggravated by China, which might use 
the threat of a massive sell-off of Treasuries in order to force the U.S. to acquiesce to its 
demands (Arrighi, 2005: 63-64; Thompson, 2007: 314-317).  
 
Others countered that the flow of foreign funds allowed the U.S. to cheaply finance its 
budget deficits, while freeing up domestic funds for higher-yielding private investments at 
home and abroad (Levey and Brown, 2005). Even in the event of a crisis, they estimated that 
a foreign sell-off of Treasuries was unlikely. The U.S. had long been successful in pressuring 
allies to hold Treasuries in exchange for military security (Murphy, 2006). And from the 
perspective of export-led rivals such as China, a massive sell-off of Treasuries would have 
the undesirable effect of lowering the value of the U.S. dollar and boosting U.S. 
competitiveness. Though a gradual decline of the dollar since the early 2000s meant an 
 6 
erosion of the value of their investments in U.S. Treasury securities, foreign central banks 
were trapped by their investments. Even rival nations had become the reluctant financiers of 
American empire (Hudson, 2003).  
 
A Puzzle  
 
Since the onset of the crisis, the side emphasizing U.S. strength appears vindicated. Those 
warning that a major crisis would lead foreign creditors to engage in a panicked sell-off of 
U.S. Treasuries have (thus far) been off the mark. Instead of a rapid decrease, the thick series 
in Figure 1 shows that foreign appetite for Treasury securities has held steady through the 
crisis.  
 
This is where the puzzle emerges. The fact investors from all over the world continue to 
deem U.S. Treasuries as safe since the crisis may seem rather surprising. After all, the global 
financial meltdown originated in the U.S. And since then, various developments have 
compromised the safe status of U.S. Treasuries. The U.S. public debt has rapidly increased in 
the wake of the crisis, and in 2013, breached the 100 percent of GDP for the first time 
outside of World War II.6 When the Federal Reserve engaged in quantitative easing, large-
scale asset purchases from 2008 to 2013, creditors feared that the U.S. was “printing money” 
to inflate away its debt burden. Political wrangling over the debt ceiling brought the federal 
government to the brink of technical default twice in 2011 and 2013, further compounding 
fears about the willingness of the U.S. to uphold its obligations to creditors. In response to 
the debt-ceiling debacle of 2011, Standard and Poor’s even took the step of downgrading the 
federal government’s credit rating, the first time in seventy years, from a pristine AAA to 
AA+.  
 
Assessing the deterioration of the U.S. fiscal position in the early stages of the crisis, Niall 
Ferguson (2010: 9) declared: “U.S. government debt is a safe haven the way Pearl Harbor 
was a safe haven in 1941.” Still investors from all over the world continue to flock to the 
U.S. Treasuries market and the federal government borrows at nearly record-low rates.  
 
Nowhere to Run 
 
Why, then, do investors from all over the world continue to pour vast sums of money into 
U.S. Treasuries? The commonly espoused explanation (Drezner, 2009: 21–22: 290; Prasad, 
2014: 107; Stokes, 2014: 1073) suggests that this resilience has little to do with U.S. strength, 
but the fact that U.S. Treasuries are still the best investment option in a world of bad 
investment options. In other words, there is simply a shortage of safe assets in the global 
financial system at present (Lysandrou, 2013: 522). And it is only when we compare U.S. 
Treasuries to the alternatives that we appreciate their (relative) safety.  
 
A debt crisis in its periphery and structural flaws in the monetary union have compromised 
the safe status of Eurzone government debt (Germain and Schwartz, 2014; Otero-Iglesias 
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and Steinberg, 2013). The depth and liquidity of the U.K. government bond market pales in 
comparison to that of the U.S. Despite a large government debt, Japan has its own economic 
troubles and its bond market does not attract much foreign investment (Katada, 2008: 405; 
Prasad, 2014: 106–107). Chinese government debt may eventually challenge U.S. Treasuries 
as the world’s safest asset, but at present underdeveloped financial markets and institutions 
dint these prospects.7  
 
Thus according to the standard explanation, global investors thus have little choice. They 
may be frustrated by problems in the U.S. In relative terms, however, these problems pale in 
comparison to those found elsewhere. This commonly espoused explanation for the 
resiliency of the U.S. Treasuries market seems reasonable enough, yet it still leaves some 
lingering questions. If the U.S. grip on global finance is so tight, then shouldn’t the Federal 
Reserve be tempted to engage in monetary policy that would inflate away the public debt? 
This type of “default by stealth” seems particularly appealing now that China owns so much 
of the U.S. public debt (Eichengreen, 2011: 119). And given this threat of default by stealth, 
aren’t foreign investors taking a stupid risk in continuing to put their faith in U.S. Treasuries?  
 
Domestic Politics 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, these questions have not received much attention in the field of IPE, 
but have been addressed by Eswar Prasad (2014), an international economist. Prasad argues 
that, despite all the political drama over the debt ceiling, the federal government is 
committed to debt repayment and is unlikely to resort to the printing press in order to inflate 
away its debt burden. In turn, he also claims that foreign investors are taking a calculated 
risk, rather than a stupid one, in investing in U.S. Treasuries. And to understand why this is 
the case, we need to look at the domestic ownership structure of the U.S. public debt.  
 
In Prasad’s estimation (2014: xiv-xv), the domestic owners of the other half of the U.S. 
public debt constitute a “powerful political constituency”. Comprised mainly of retirees and 
near-retirees, this group has a low risk appetite and high savings and therefore invests heavily 
in Treasury securities, either directly or indirectly through its ownership of pension and 
mutual funds. These domestic owners have a direct stake in the financial health of the 
federal government and will resist any attempt by the federal government to compromise the 
sanctity of their investments in the U.S. Treasuries market.  
 
Now, according to Prasad the power of domestic owners of the public debt is amplified 
precisely because of their age. Older people, he points out, tend to vote in greater numbers. 
And because many older people also live in swing states such as Florida, they play a key role 
in determining the outcomes of presidential elections. Domestic owners of the U.S. public 
debt would bear a significant cost if the U.S. were to inflate away its debt burden. Thus 
Prasad’s essential argument is that the interests of foreign and domestic owners of the public 
debt are united because both have an interest in the creditworthiness of U.S. Treasuries. 
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Foreigners, even if they are not explicitly aware of it, can maintain confidence in U.S. 
Treasuries thanks in large part to the power of domestic owners, who play a key role in 
pressuring the federal government to uphold its debt obligations.  
 
Prasad’s approach stands out in identifying the role that domestic politics play in reinforcing 
the safe status of U.S. Treasuries. Yet his claims are not systematically explored. He does not 
give any exact figures on how much of the public debt is owned directly or indirectly by 
retirees and near-retirees. Nor does he give any substantive evidence of how older 
Americans use their voting power to further their interests as owners of the public debt. We 
can, however, evaluate his claims by piecing together some evidence for ourselves.  
 
The Power of Older Americans 
 
Evaluating Prasad’s first claim regarding the ownership of the public debt by older 
Americans is relatively simple. Table 1 uses data from the Federal Reserve’s 2013 Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) to disaggregate ownership of the U.S. public debt. The measure 
of public debt in the table is broad: it includes both direct household holdings of the public 
debt, as well as pension and mutual fund wealth, which is assumed to represent indirect 
ownership of the public debt through asset managers.   
 
Table 1 
Age Versus Class: Share of Public Debt in 2013  
(Direct & Indirect) 
 
 % with ownership  
stake 
% share of  
public debt 
%  
of population 
per capita 
holdings 
% of electorate 
60+ 48 53 33 $57,000 40 
Top 1% 92 33 1 $1,150,000 >1 
 
Note: Indirect holdings include ownership of pension and mutual funds. Pension funds include all IRA and 
Keogh accounts and other pension assets; mutual funds include all stock, tax-free, other bond, combination, 
other and money market mutual funds. Direct holdings include ownership of savings bonds, other federal 
bonds and U.S. government or government backed bond mutual funds.  
 
Source: Data in the first four columns from the Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances; data on 
percentage of the electorate aged 60 plus in the last column from McDonald (2016). 
 
 
The first row in Table 1 shows the share of the public debt owned by households with a 
head of house aged 60 and over (a proxy for retirees and near-retirees). As we see, 48 
percent of 60 plus households reported to have some direct or indirect stake in the public 
debt. Older households own over half of the direct and indirect holdings of the public debt 
in 2013, yet they make up only about one-third of the adult population. In absolute terms, 
the value of investments in the public debt for households aged 60 plus amounted to 
$57,000 (significantly higher than the $35,000 owned by the average U.S. household).  
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At first blush, the data in the first row of Table 1 provide some empirical confirmation for 
Prasad’s first claim. Retirees and near-retirees do indeed dominate ownership of the public 
debt in the sense that their ownership share is larger than their share of the population, and 
that their per capita share is larger than the U.S. average. Where the task becomes more 
difficult is in evaluating Prasad’s second claim regarding the ways that older Americans wield 
their voting power to further their interests as owners of the public debt.  
 
Prasad’s arguments have obvious affinities with the literature on the “credible 
commitments” furnished by domestic institutions. Pioneered by Douglass North and Barry 
Weingast (1989), the main idea behind this literature is that representative institutions can 
alter the incentives for government by making the punishment from default more painful 
than the gains from refusing to pay. A democratically elected legislature may act as a veto 
player to rein in a profligate executive, and periodic elections allow voters to oust 
officeholders that renege on their financial commitments (Schultz and Weingast, 2003: 12). 
Representative institutions, in short, enhance creditworthiness. And this is especially the case 
if owners of the public debt, a group with a direct stake in the fiscal credibility of 
government, have meaningful influence over the democratic process (Stasavage, 2003: 9–
11).   
 
As Table 1 indicates, older Americans do make up a significant part of the electorate (around 
40 percent in the 2014 general election). But this idea that older Americans are a cohesive 
voting bloc, and act as a powerful veto player ensuring credible commitments from 
government, conflicts with much of the research within the field of gerontology. While older 
Americans do tend to vote in greater numbers, the findings in this field consistently 
demonstrate that they are divided in terms of their policy preferences and even their partisan 
affiliations (Holladay and Coombs, 2004).  
 
For all of the talk of inter-generational conflict, the empirical record shows little evidence of 
disagreements on policy, including on contentious issues such as social spending and 
taxation, between different age groups (Fullerton and Dixon, 2010; Hamil-Luker, 2001; 
Rhodebeck, 1993; Street and Cossman, 2006). In fact, some research indicates that rifts are 
more likely to emerge within age groups than between them (Day, 1993). Recent polling by 
the Pew Research Center found that the ideological profiles of older Americans were evenly 
split, with 33 percent of Americans 65 and over in “left wing” categories (e.g. “solid liberals” 
and “faith and family left”) and 32 percent in “right wing” categories (e.g. “steadfast 
conservatives” and “business conservatives”) (Desilver, 2014). And despite evidence of a 
growing age gap in electoral politics in recent years (Fisher, 2008), party affiliation amongst 
older Americans is actually quite split. Pew (2014) polling data shows that party identification 
is almost evenly divided among those aged 59 and over: 44 percent identified as Republican 
or lean Republican, while 46 percent identified as Democrat or lean Democrat.  
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Deep divisions among older Americans undermine the popular image of seniors as a 
juggernaut within U.S. politics (Holladay and Coombs, 2004). Given the empirical reality, it 
seems highly implausible that seniors could use their ownership of the public debt to 
exercise sustained veto power over the political process.  
 
From Age to Class 
 
Why are older Americans so divided politically? Part of the reason might have to do with 
increasing inequality among them. As a group, seniors have not been isolated from the 
growing disparities in the distribution of wealth and income that have characterized 
American society more generally over the past few decades (Crystal et al., 2016). These 
disparities also find their way into the ownership structure of the public debt. According to 
SCF data for 2013, the top ten percent of 60 plus households ranked by net wealth owned 
76 percent of the public debt owned by older Americans, while the top one percent of 60 
plus households owned a quarter. The data suggest that it is not older Americans per se, but 
wealthy older Americans that are united together by their ownership stake in the public debt.  
 
This simple observation leads to another possibility for identifying the locus of power in the 
domestic politics the public indebtedness. Perhaps domestic owners are best classified not by 
their age, but by their class position at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy. Thanks in 
large part to the stunning successes of Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty First 
Century, issues of inequality and the “class warfare” that pits the top one percent against the 
rest of the population have gained a great deal of attention. Given the renewed focus on 
inequality since the crisis, it is worthwhile exploring class as an alternative basis for locating 
the power of domestic owners of the public debt.   
 
For comparative purposes, the second row of Table 1 shows the share of the public debt 
that is owned by the top one percent of U.S. households (ranked by net wealth). As we can 
see, in 2013, 92 percent of households within the top percentile reported to have some direct 
or indirect stake in the public debt (compared to 48 percent of households aged 60 plus). 
The top percentile of households owned 33 percent of the public debt, but obviously only 
make up only one percent of the population. The value of the average household in the top 
percentile’s investments in the public debt amounted to well over $1 million (compared to 
$57,000 for the average household aged 60 plus).   
 
Class Cohesion 
 
Thus on a per capita basis, ownership of the public debt is more heavily concentrated in 
favour of the top percentile than for older Americans. This suggests that class, rather than 
age, offers a better starting point for exploring the power of domestic owners of the public 
debt. But what can we say about the relative cohesiveness of the top one percent as a social 
group? Some have alluded to possible divisions within the top percentile, mainly due to the 
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fact that most of the wealth and income gains since the 1970s have went to the top 0.01 
percent (Anonymous, 2014). And to be sure, ownership of the public debt within the top 
percentile is just as skewed as it is among seniors. In fact, the top 0.1 percent owns roughly a 
quarter of the top percentile’s share of U.S. Treasuries. Yet even though the category is 
imperfect, there is still plenty of evidence to support the claim that the top one percent is, in 
relative terms, much more cohesive as a social group than retirees and near-retirees.  
 
In addition to commonly shared cultural and consumptive practices (Di Muzio, 2015), the 
top percentile also shares a coherent set of political preferences. Page, Bartels and 
Seawright’s (2013: 65) path breaking Survey of Economically Successful Americans (SESA) 
not only reveals “political homogeneity” amongst members of the top one percent, but also 
that political preferences of the top percentile contrast starkly with those of the general 
public. Most significantly, SESA shows that the top percentile’s support for certain policies, 
especially for social spending cuts and deregulation, is much higher than it is among ordinary 
Americans.8  
 
The SESA findings also indicate a high degree of cohesion within the top one percent in 
terms of partisan preferences (Page et al., 2013: 60). 58 percent of those surveyed identified 
with the Republican Party and only 27 percent with the Democrats. Furthermore, affluent 
Americans that do identify with the Democratic Party tend to be much more conservative 
than the average Democrat on economic issues (ibid.: 60). SESA also shows that political 
cohesion within the top percentile is matched by unusually high political activism (ibid.: 53). 
99 percent of affluent Americans surveyed by SESA voted in 2008 and around two-thirds 
contributed money to political campaigns (as opposed to 14 percent of the general 
population) (ibid.: 54). The top percentile was also much more likely to contact politicians 
directly and in SESA interviews often referred to politicians on a first-name basis (ibid.: 54).  
 
Perhaps most importantly, other research indicates that the cohesion and activism of affluent 
Americans translates into significant influence over public policy outcomes (Bartels 2008; 
Gilens, 2005, 2012; Gilens and Page, 2014). In other words, these studies show with a great 
deal of statistical precision that the preferences of elites consistently influence political 
decision-making, whether in terms of congressional and senate voting or actual policy 
changes. 
 
Beyond Veto Playing 
 
Existing research provides clear evidence of the incredible power wielded by the top 
percentile. Yet something obvious that stands out in Table 1 is the fact that the top 
percentile makes up a smaller percentage of the electorate than retirees and near-retirees. As 
a very small bloc of voters, the top one percent is highly unlikely to form a veto player in the 
traditional sense of the term. Instead, most of top percentile’s power and influence is 
wielded outside of the “open contestation” of electoral politics (Pierson, 2015: 125). But 
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then this observation raises a fundamental question: If the top percentile is not a significant 
veto player, then how do we examine its influence as owners of the public debt?   
 
Unfortunately, the existing literature on “credible commitments” does not offer much of an 
empirical blueprint. The more sophisticated empirical studies within this literature are 
focused on early modern Europe, especially on late seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
Britain after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Carruthers, 1996; Stasavage, 2003, 2007). It is 
arguably much easier in this context to identify the direct political influence of domestic 
owners of the public debt. In the early days of the British financial system, government 
securities were by far the most prominent form of financial wealth. And a tiny but powerful 
group of London financiers – commonly referred to as the “monied interest” – dominated 
ownership of the public debt, as well as the debt securities of joint stock companies that lent 
to government in exchange for charter privileges. Domestic owners of the public debt 
constituted a clearly defined social group with a clearly defined set of interests, and perhaps 
the most important of these interests was to safeguard their investments in the public debt. 
What is more, the monied interest was represented in parliament by the Whig party, which 
consistently voted in favour of measures that would make the reliable servicing of the public 
debt a policy priority for government (Stasavage, 2007: 127). This was in stark contrast to the 
Tory party, which represented the taxpaying landowners and at times openly advocated 
government default (ibid.: 125).  
 
Today in the U.S. things are more ambiguous. The public debt is still crucial to modern 
finance, but government securities now stand alongside a vast array of other financial 
instruments. In contrast to the early monied interest, there is no evidence to suggest that 
domestic owners of U.S. Treasuries today regard lending to government as their primary role, 
even if they own significant stakes in the public debt directly or indirectly. There is also little 
evidence that domestic creditors self-identify as a group, or that others, including their 
foreign counterparts and the federal government, identify them as a coherent group.9 There 
is no political party, or even a dominant faction of a political party, that explicitly represents 
domestic creditors to the federal government. To complicate matters, there is no specific 
lobbying organization that represents owners of the U.S. public debt and thus no sign of any 
“instrumental power” over the political process.  
 
Contemporary realties thus make it difficult to analyze how ownership of the public debt 
translates into political influence. To examine this influence in the contemporary context, we 
need to depart from the realm of open contestation and look at the indirect forms of power 
that the top percentile wields to ensure credible commitments from government.   
 
Mapping Concentration 
 
In my own research, I have explored the class dimensions of domestic ownership of the U.S. 
public debt (Hager, 2014, 2015, 2016; see also Tett, 2013). Most importantly, what my 
 13 
research indicates is that inequality in ownership of the public debt mirrors wealth inequality 
more generally. When the wealth share of the top percentile of households and large 
corporations increases or decreases, so too does their share of the public debt.  
 
In the 1920s the top percentile owned 45 percent of all direct household sector holdings of 
Treasury securities. This share gradually fell over the following decades and reached its nadir 
of around 20 percent in 1960s. The top percentile’s share of the public debt then gradually 
increased to one-third by the early 1980s and continued to increase, reaching 38 percent in 
2007. What is most shocking is the rapid increase in ownership concentration that has taken 
place since the onset of the global financial crisis. By 2010, the top percentile’s share of 
public debt was nearing its historical highs at 42 percent; by 2013, the share had increased 
even further to a shocking and unprecedented 56 percent.  
 
A similar dynamic underpins corporate ownership of the public debt. Over the past three 
and a half decades, the top 2,500 U.S. corporations have increased their share of corporate 
holdings of the public debt from 65 percent in 1977-1981 to 82 percent in 2006-2010. Much 
like the household sector, concentration in corporate ownership of the public debt has 
intensified since the onset of the crisis. In 2006 the top 2,500 corporations owned 77 percent 
of the corporate share and this climbed to 86 percent by 2010. These corporate holdings of 
the public debt are increasingly dominated by mutual funds, which are heavily concentrated 
in favor of the top one percent, at the expense of pension funds, which are widely held.  
 
An Unintended Consequence 
 
What explains increasing concentration in domestic ownership of Treasury securities? Here 
power is at the front and center of the explanation, but only indirectly as a by-product, or 
unintended consequence, of the influence of the top one percent in other areas of public 
policy.  
 
Since 1970s, growth in the public debt has been driven by two processes: gradually 
increasing federal government spending, on the one hand, and stagnant federal tax revenues, 
on the other. As Wolfgang Streeck (2014) argues, the gradual increase in government 
expenditures can be regarded as a necessary function of capitalist development. As the 
market expands and deepens, extending its commodifying logic to ever more aspects of 
social life, the government must increase its activities in the realms of infrastructure, policing 
and social protection. Tax stagnation, however, is the result of a more overtly political 
process. For Streeck, capitalism has a tendency to concentrate wealth and this, in turn, 
augments the power of top earners to resist the government’s attempts to extract resources 
from them. Hacker and Pierson (2010: 182-185) have documented this resistance, showing 
how elites in the U.S. have successfully engaged in a highly organized tax revolt, including 
intense lobbying efforts, to reduce their tax burdens over the past few decades.  
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Thus growth in the public debt is due primarily to efforts on the part of the top percentile to 
reverse progressive taxation. Though the top one percent and large corporations that are 
owned by the top percentile pay the bulk of federal taxes, they are paying less and less taxes 
as a percentage of their income. As a result, the top percentile has more money freed up to 
invest in the growing stock of U.S. Treasury securities, which are a particularly appealing 
investment option in times of crisis. Ultimately, what this means is that the federal 
government now chooses to supply elites with “risk free” Treasury securities instead of 
taxing their incomes (Piketty, 2014: 566).  
 
Structural Power 
 
It is important to stress that increased concentration in ownership of the public debt is not 
the outcome of conscious action: the government has not planned it; nor has the top 
percentile orchestrated it as part of a coherent political strategy. But for the top percentile, 
concentrated ownership of U.S. Treasuries is, nevertheless, the unintended (and beneficial) 
by-product of the exercise of power in other areas of public policy. In this sense, power 
helps to explain the causes of concentration in ownership of the public debt. But what 
consequences, if any, does a public debt concentrated in favour of the top percentile have for 
the exercise of power?   
 
I argue that the consequences of concentrated ownership of the public debt for power are 
most effectively analyzed at the structural level. The notion of structural power begins with 
the recognition of the unique position that private business occupies in capitalist societies as 
the dominant owner of wealth and the provider of wages for workers (Hacker and Pierson, 
2002: 280-281). Ownership of wealth gives business the capacity to make authoritative 
decisions over when, where and how much to invest, and these decisions are based on 
calculations of expected profitability. Control over investment, and crucially, the ability to 
withdraw financing through an “investment strike”, is the source of the structural power for 
business. The latent “threat of exit” is enough to compel workers and government officials 
to respect private property and the need for business confidence.10 In this way, research 
emphasizing the structural power is built on the assumption that capitalist societies have an 
inherent bias that privileges business interests.  
 
For government, the structural power of business is felt most immediately in the public 
finances (Gill and Law, 1989: 481; Gough and Farnsworth, 2006: 86). The centrality of 
private investment means that the government depends on business for a substantial portion 
of its tax revenues. And when the government borrows it becomes dependent on financial 
markets. Like private sector investment, investors in government bonds make their decisions 
based on expectations about future profitability. The structural power of owners of the 
public debt stems from their ability to sell their existing holdings of government bonds, or, 
when the government auctions new debt, to command higher interest rates or refusing to 
purchase the newly auctioned debt. The ability to influence the cost of borrowing through 
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the sale and purchase of public debt ensures that governments commit themselves to the 
principles of “sound finance”.  
 
Though it has been influential in the field of IPE, one glaring problem with the structural 
view has to do with its explanation of variations in power across time and space. Capitalist 
states may all adhere to the “sound finance” doctrine, but this adherence fluctuates over time 
and varies greatly between them. Thus in order to empirically explore structural power in any 
meaningful way, it needs to be treated as a variable and not a constant (Hacker and Pierson, 
2002: 282). When it comes specifically to the structural power as domestic owners of the 
public debt, influence is dependent on two main factors.  
 
The first factor is the degree of concentration in domestic ownership of the public debt. All 
other things being equal, the greater the degree of ownership concentration, the higher the 
threat that comes from the ability to exit the government bond market. The second factor is 
the overall level of public indebtedness. A government with a public debt of three percent of 
GDP might feel less compelled to worry about its creditworthiness in financial markets, even 
when its debt is 100 percent concentrated in the hands of powerful groups. Similarly, a 
government with a public debt of 200 percent of GDP might feel more compelled to 
maintain its good standing with investors when its debt is widely held.  
 
Ownership, Power and Ideology 
 
My own research suggests that the structural power of domestic owners of the public debt 
has increased markedly over the past few decades and that the consequences of this power 
are primarily ideological. To explore the ideological dimensions of structural power, I 
conducted a simple content analysis of the Economic Report of the President (ERP), the main 
document through which the U.S. presidency details and justifies its economic policy to the 
public (Hager, 2015: 518–520).  
 
Conceptually, I employ Streeck’s (2014: 81) simple dichotomy, which identifies certain terms 
with the interests of bondholders (e.g. international, investors, interest rates, confidence), 
and other terms with the interests of the citizenry more generally (e.g. national, public 
opinion, citizens, loyalty). Recording the frequency with which the respective terms appear in 
the ERP, the research shows that, as ownership concentration and the level of public 
indebtedness both increase, the terms that are associated with the interests of bondholders 
take precedence. For example, in the postwar period, when both ownership concentration 
and the level of public debt were quite low, references to the terms associated with 
bondholders were only 75 percent as frequent as those associated with the citizenry. Yet in 
the context of the crisis (2006-2010), when both ownership concentration and the level of 
public indebtedness were high, references to the terms associated with bondholders were 
twice as frequent as those associated with the citizenry.  
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Assigning causality is always tricky, especially in this case where a lack of reliable historical 
data on the ownership structure of the public debt preclude any possibility of a large-n 
statistical analysis. As Hacker and Pierson (2002: 285) are careful to point out, empirical 
analyses of power need to distinguish between association and causation. Just because the 
content of policy is congruent with certain interests does not mean that the policy shift itself 
was caused by the structural power of domestic owners of the public debt. Rather than 
reflecting the ability of domestic owners of the public debt to shape policy in line with their 
preferences, the change in policy might have been brought about by some other process. 
The change might also have been brought about by mere accident, or the line of causation 
might well be reversed: the shift in policy might lead to increased concentration in 
ownership of the public debt. As presented here, the analysis also does not take into account 
the rise of foreign ownership of the public debt itself, which could play a crucial role in 
shaping the ideological climate due the latent exit threat of global investors.  
 
But what this empirical research does illustrate, even if only modestly, is that there has been 
a transformation in policy, one that provides an ideological climate that privileges the 
interests of the owners of the public debt. Thus the empirical record suggests that these 
owners, whether domestic or foreign, and whether they are fully aware of it or not, should 
be confident that the federal government will reliably elevate financial imperatives above the 
concerns of the general citizenry within policymaking. This ideological privileging of the 
interests of bondholders serves as an alternative but nonetheless powerful form of credible 
commitment upon which foreign owners of U.S. Treasuries can rely.  
 
A Deeper Bond 
Evidence indicates that the locus of power for domestic owners of the public debt is to be 
found not with older Americans, as Prasad suggests, but with the top one percent of 
Americans at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy. But why does this matter? What 
does an emphasis on the class identity of domestic owners of the public debt reveal that the 
emphasis on age neglects or overlooks?  
 
The alternative focus on class does not alter Prasad’s general conclusion. Whether we focus 
on age or class, we still end up concluding that domestic owners of the public debt represent 
a formidable political force whose interests are closely aligned with their foreign 
counterparts. What the alternative focus on class does reveal, however, is that domestic 
owners are much more formidable than Prasad’s analysis suggests. Based on the analysis 
here, foreign owners of the public debt can be even more reassured about the abilities of the 
powerful constituency of domestic owners to pressure the U.S. federal government to 
maintain its creditworthiness, thereby ensuring the sanctity of the Treasuries market as the 
world’s safest financial asset.  
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Most crucially, although the alternative class focus does not alter Prasad’s general conclusion, 
it does illuminate other “bonds” between domestic and foreign owners of the public debt 
that are neglected in his analysis. Focusing on class, it becomes clear that foreigners are not 
the only ones to gain from the ownership structure of the public debt as it is currently 
configured. Powerful domestic owners also have something to gain from foreign investment 
in the U.S. Treasuries market.  
 
Barry Eichengreen (2011: 118) notes “a remarkable degree of consensus” amongst 
economists on the role that foreign investment in U.S. Treasuries plays in lowering U.S. 
interest rates. Francis Warnock and Veronica Warnock (2009: 904) find that capital inflows 
to the U.S. Treasuries market have a “statistically and economically significant impact” on 
lowering the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds, an impact that extends to other U.S. financial 
instruments, including household mortgages. In facilitating access to cheap credit for 
domestic borrowers, I argue that foreign ownership helps to reinforce the power of 
domestic owners of the public debt through two main channels.   
 
Government Credit: Deflecting Calls for Progressive Taxation 
 
The first channel through which cheap credit reinforces the power of domestic owners of 
the public debt is in lowing the cost of borrowing for the federal government. As mentioned 
earlier, the federal government is currently borrowing record amounts outside of the two 
world wars, at nearly record-low rates. Cheap credit from abroad relieves political pressures 
on the government to steer an alternative course in terms of its public finance policies. And 
this status quo in the public finances, in turn, serves the interests of domestic owners of the 
public debt at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy.   
 
How exactly does this work? Earlier I argued that the explosive increase in the public debt 
over the past few decades have been driven primarily by tax stagnation and declining tax 
progressivity, which were the product of an organized tax revolt by the top percentile of 
households and the largest corporations. Declining tax progressivity is the root cause of an 
increasing public debt. And this means that the federal government borrows from elites 
instead of taxing them. As a result, the public finances help contribute to growing wealth and 
income inequality.  
 
One way to reverse inequalities at the heart of the public finances would be to roll back 
declining progressivity and implement more progressive forms of taxation. As part of a 
double-edged strategy to tackle inequality and reduce the public debt, progressive taxation 
has been advocated by Vermont Senator and presidential-hopeful Bernie Sanders, as well as 
the Economic Policy Institute, Roosevelt Institute and the Flip the Debt campaign, an anti-
austerity splinter group of the Occupy movement (Bradner, 2015; Fieldhouse, 2011; 
Roosevelt Institute, 2011). Flip the Debt’s boisterous slogan – “Hey 1%! Pay your damn 
taxes!” – places responsibility for public debt reduction on the shoulders of wealthy 
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households and large corporations that have saved an estimated $2.3 trillion through tax 
loopholes, offshore tax havens and tax cuts (Kilkenny, 2013).11  
 
With foreign willingness to underwrite the U.S. pubic debt, seemingly ad infinitum, the federal 
government faces less pressure to bow to these pressures. The low cost of borrowing 
facilitated by foreign capital legitimates escalating levels of public debt and lessens the 
immediacy of calls to increase taxes on wealthy households and large corporations. In this 
way, cheap finance from abroad serves to sustain the domestic status quo, which works in 
favor of the top one percent.  
 
Household Credit: Dampening Resentment Toward Inequality 
 
There is another less obvious but crucial channel through which foreign owners of the 
public debt reinforce the power of their domestic counterparts. As the work of Warnock and 
Warnock suggests, foreign purchases of U.S. Treasury securities have clear knock-on effects, 
lowering the costs of borrowing not only for government but also for households and 
businesses. By facilitating access to cheap household credit, foreign ownership of the public 
debt also helps to relieve social tensions that emerge from decades-long wealth and income 
stagnation for the vast majority of Americans.  
 
Discussions of inequality tend to focus on the top percentile’s increasing share of total 
wealth and income since the early 1980s. Yet top earners have not only taken a greater share 
of the overall pie, they have also seen the absolute levels of their fortunes expand. 
Meanwhile, the wealth and income of those below the top percentile have stagnated over the 
same period.  
 
The recent work of Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman (2014: 48) reveals great disparities 
in wealth and income growth since the early 1980s. According to their research, low and 
middle-income Americans in the bottom 90 percent of distribution have seen their “real” 
wealth and income increase 0.1 percent and 0.7 percent respectively from the mid-1980s to 
2012. In contrast, the “real” wealth and income of the top percentile grew 3.9 percent and 
3.4 percent respectively over the same period. With stagnant wealth and income, those in the 
bottom 90 percent have virtually zero savings, while those in the top one percent have 
managed to save 36 percent of their income.  
 
With stagnant wealth, income and deteriorating savings, households in the bottom 90 
percent face the specter of declining living standards, and, for those not already at the very 
bottom, declining positions within the class hierarchy. Engelbert Stockhammer (2015: 947-
949) documents how low and middle-income Americans, in an effort to stave off these nasty 
consequences, have rapidly accumulated debt. Debt-to-income ratios for households in the 
bottom fifty percent have increased from 0.61 in 1989 to 1.37 in 2007, and from 0.81 to 1.48 
for households in the fiftieth to ninetieth percentile. Meanwhile the debt-to-income ratio for 
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the top percentile has increased much more modestly from 0.25 to 0.37 over the same 
period.12  
 
Thus one of the main consequences of rising inequality has been a concomitant explosion in 
household indebtedness. In his renowned book Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten 
the World Economy, Raghuram Rajan (2010) was one of the first to systematically examine the 
link between inequality and household indebtedness, and most importantly, to situate it 
within a global context.  
 
Rajan argues that expanding household credit is the path of least resistance for the U.S. 
federal government in dealing with rising inequality since the early 1980s.13 Faced with 
wealth and income stagnation, and a dwindling share of the distributional pie, access to 
cheap credit placates low and middle-income Americans. This placating role is especially 
important because a great deal of household borrowing goes toward home ownership, a key 
facet of the American dream (Schwartz, 2009). On the flipside, elites in the top percentile 
favour the expansion of household credit, seeing it as a more palatable solution to inequality 
than redistribution through progressive taxation.  
 
Yet, as Rajan is careful to point out, there are domestic limits on credit expansion as a means 
of addressing inequality. Efforts to boost consumption via credit expansion fan the flames of 
inflation and put pressure on the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, a move that would, 
in turn, curb household borrowing and consumption. Rajan identifies two global factors that 
help the U.S. to supersede these domestic limits. First, the flood of cheap imports, mostly 
from China, relieves inflationary pressures. Second, the flood of cheap capital from export-
led countries into the U.S. Treasuries market puts downward pressure on U.S. interest rates.  
 
Household debt serves as a compensatory mechanism in the face of wealth and income 
stagnation for low and middle-income households. The constant flood of foreign money 
into the U.S., in facilitating widespread access to credit, helps to dampen resentment toward 
the top percentile that not only takes a bigger share of the distributional pie, but has also 
seen its wealth and income grow in absolute terms since the early 1980s.  
 
Conclusion: A Status Quo Crisis? 
 
In this article, I presented new evidence to explain the resiliency of U.S. Treasury securities 
as the world’s premier safe asset. Alongside the commonly recognized lack of alternatives 
(i.e. the shortage of other safe assets), I claimed that the existence of powerful domestic 
owners of the public debt bolsters confidence in U.S. Treasuries. In contrast to the 
innovative work of Prasad, I argued that the power of domestic owners of the public debt 
derives not from their age but from their class position at the top of the wealth and income 
hierarchy.  
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As the dominant domestic owners of the public debt, the top percentile of U.S. households 
wields most of its power outside of the realm of electoral politics. Rapid concentration in 
ownership of the public debt is itself an outcome of the top percentile’s power to organize a 
successful revolt against progressive taxation. This concentrated ownership confers 
structural power on domestic owners of the public debt, which is felt mostly at the 
ideological level. Although cause and effect is impossible to determine with existing data, it is 
nevertheless significant that growing concentration in ownership of the public debt has 
proceeded alongside an ideological transformation in federal policy, one that privileges the 
interests of bondholders over general citizenry. This ideological climate provides an 
alternative form of credible commitment that works in favour of owners of the public debt, 
both foreign and domestic.  
 
The results of this research do not alter Prasad’s main conclusion. Whether we focus on age 
or class, we still end up concluding that the interests of domestic owners of the public debt 
are closely aligned with their foreign counterparts. But the alternative focus on class does 
draw our attention to other “bonds” between the two categories of owners that are 
neglected with Prasad’s analysis. Focusing on class, it becomes apparent that foreigners not 
only gain from the existence of powerful domestic owners, but that powerful domestic 
owners gain from the seemingly insatiable foreign appetite for U.S. Treasuries. The powerful 
“bond” of interests between foreign and domestic owners of the public debt also works to 
sustain the dominant position of the U.S. within global finance. And, in supplying cheap 
credit to the U.S. federal government and to U.S. households, foreign ownership of the 
public debt works to sustain the dominant position of the top percentile at the top of the 
wealth and income hierarchy.  
 
At least in the short-term the status of U.S. Treasuries as the world’s safest asset looks set to 
endure. Thus the conclusions reached in this article therefore correspond with Helleiner’s 
(2014) view that what we have witnessed has been a “status quo crisis”, one that has done 
little to alter global financial governance.14  
 
Projecting the resilience of the current arrangements into the future is decidedly more 
difficult. In the long-term, the U.S. status as the world’s primary safe haven may indeed be 
challenged. China’s apparent willingness to take on a more prominent leadership role points 
toward a potential long-term shift in the distribution of global financial power. Recent 
efforts to open up the Chinese government bond market to foreign ownership, as part of the 
inclusion of the renminbi as part of the IMF’s SDR basket, might be a crucial turning point 
in this regard. What is clear is that any attempt to assess the long-term resilience of the U.S. 
Treasuries market as the world’s safest asset will require a closer examination of the creditor 
side of the debtor/creditor relationship, something that falls out of the scope of the analysis 
here.15 
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The main point to take away from the analysis in this article is that any attempt to explain 
the resiliency of the U.S. Treasuries market, and to project this resiliency into the short-term 
and long-term future, must taken into account the complex interactions between the global 
and the domestic. 
 
Notes 	
1 U.S. Treasury securities are financial instruments issued by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. Commonly referred to as the U.S. public debt, Treasury securities represent the 
indebtedness of the U.S. federal government. Throughout this article I use the terms U.S. 
public debt, U.S. Treasury securities and U.S. Treasuries market interchangeably.  
2 From 2008 to 2015, the interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds has averaged 2.6 percent, 
less than half of the average rate since 1980 (6.2 percent) and considerably lower than the 
average rate since 1790 (4.8 percent). The 1940s mark the only sustained period when 
average borrowing rates were lower (two percent). Data are from Global Financial Data 
(series code: IGUSA10D).  
3 U.S. Treasury securities also figure prominently in the voluminous literature on “dollar 
hegemony” (i.e. the role of the U.S. dollar as a key international currency) (see Chey, 2012; 
Norrloff, 2014). As a store of value, government securities fulfill one of the key functions of 
money, alongside its functions as a unit of account and a measure of value (Cohen 2013: 
164). Throughout this piece I draw on this literature only insofar as it relates to the store of 
value role of the public debt.  4	For a discussion of the data tracking the identities of foreign owners of the U.S. public 
debt, see Hager (2016.)  
5 Private demand for Treasury securities has been spurred by crisis-era regulatory changes, 
including the Basel III accord, which require banks to hold more safe assets on their balance 
sheets (Prasad, 2014: 80; see also Arslanalp and Tsuda, 2014). For a critical take on the 
continued designation of government debt as “risk free” in banking regulation, see Tett 
(2009, 2011). 
6 This is when the public debt is measured on a gross basis (i.e. including the “intra-
government” portion of its own debt that the federal government holds). The intricacies of 
public debt accounting are examined in Hager (2016).   
7 At the end of 2013, foreigners owned only 2.4 percent of Chinese government bonds. Yet 
as Spencer Lake (2015: 3) notes, recent efforts have been made to increase foreign 
ownership by opening access to China’s interbank bond market. This liberalization effort is 
part of a broader strategy to internationalize the renminbi and to make the currency, 
together with the USD, the Euro, the Yen and the Pound, the fifth in a basket of “elite” 
currencies to value Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). In what some regard as a watershed 
moment, the IMF announced the inclusion of the renminbi in its SDR basket in November 
of 2015 (Kynge, 2015).  
8 Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013: 55) also discovered that the top percentile is very much 
concerned with budget deficits. In fact, around one-third of respondents to their survey 
deemed budget deficits the most important issue facing the country, significantly more than 
any other issue. In a poll conducted by CBS, only seven percent of the general public 
mentioned budget deficits or the public debt as the most important issue. Yet the SESA 
findings also reveal considerable nuance in the top percentile’s view of budget deficits and 
two additional points should be made (ibid.: 60). First, the survey shows that the top 
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percentile strongly favours spending cuts to tax hikes as the way of bringing down deficits. 
Second, the top percentile is twice as likely than members of the general public to support 
deficit spending in the context of recession and war.  
9 Instead, politicians tend to speak in vague and impersonal terms about the power of the 
“bond market” (Ferguson, 2008: 65).  
10 This threat of exit is enhanced by global capital mobility, which gives business not only the 
choice to invest or not invest at home, but also to invest elsewhere.  
11 The position of Flip the Debt assumes that, sooner or later, either through spending cuts 
or tax hikes, the public debt must be reduced from current levels. Yet as proponents of 
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) explain, a monetarily sovereign entity such as the U.S. 
federal government (i.e. an entity that issues debt in a currency it fully controls), is never 
revenue constrained like a household or firm and can never technically go bankrupt (Wray, 
2012). The refusal to acknowledge the implications of monetary sovereignty points to the 
unquestioned sanctity of “sound finance” within contemporary society.  
12 Edward Wolff (2014) shows that the crisis has done little to alter the distribution of 
household indebtedness. In his analysis of the 2013 SCF, Wolff calculates a debt-to-income 
ratio of 0.38 for the top percentile and 1.25 for the middle three quintiles (households in the 
twentieth to eightieth percentile of distribution).  
13 The tendency for the U.S. political system to favour populist demands for credit has a long 
history. In the first half of the nineteenth century, northern states bowed to widespread 
pressures, especially from small farmers, to facilitate greater access to credit by instituting 
free banking laws (Calomiris and Haber, 2014: 171).  14	At the domestic level, however, the idea of a status quo crisis is potentially misleading 
because it glosses over the rapid increase in the power of the top percentile since 2007-8. 	
15 Vermeiren (2013) provides a rigorous account of how China’s domestic political economy 
shapes and constrains its role within the global monetary system.   
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